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Family Quarrels and Mental Harmony
Spinoza’s Oikos–Polis Analogy
Hasana Sharp
In chapter 6, paragraph 4, of his Political Treatise Spinoza invokes the
traditional analogy between the oikos and the polis. This has been overlooked
by commentators, but careful attention to it reveals a number of interesting
features of Spinoza’s political theory. Spinoza aims in this paragraph to
challenge the perception that absolute monarchy offers greater respite from
the intolerable anxiety of the state of nature than does democracy. He
acknowledges that people associate monarchical rule with peace and stabi-
lity, but urges them to consider that such a condition deforms its subjects.
Unchallenged monarchy may be credited with a certain ostensible order,
“but if slavery, barbarism, and desolation are to be called peace, there can be
nothing more wretched for mankind than peace.”1 This is all familiar to
friends of Spinoza, but what kind of democracy is an alternative to those
monarchies that tend toward despotism? It is a form of association, he
suggests, that resembles a bitterly quarrelsome but nevertheless virtuous
family. With such a suggestion, he admits that democratic or popular rule
is typically turbulent and disorderly, but urges his reader to view contentions
and disputes as a kind of salutary discord that preserves rather than threatens
the vitality of the commonwealth.
Attention to the oikos–polis analogy illustrates the difficulty of classifying
Spinoza’s political thought. On the one hand, his deployment of the
analogy underscores the tension between his political anthropology and
the social contract tradition. On the other hand, his unusual use of the
analogy, which highlights quarrels, opposition to authority, and asymme-
tries of power, likewise marks him off from classical republicanism’s
inheritance from ancient philosophy. Even as it remains difficult to insert
Spinoza into an existing democratic tradition, his political theory is replete
with insights into the promises and challenges proper to constituting a life
in common, be it familial or political.
1 TP, ch. 6 | G III/298/14–15.
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6.1 The Family and the City in the Seventeenth Century
Seventeenth-century political theory is marked by disputes over the appro-
priateness of the ancient analogy between the family and the polis. Typically,
the analogy was upheld by traditionalists interested in defending patriarchal
power and natural hierarchies in human relations. The defense of the
analogy often reflected the promotion of natural differences, rigid social
roles, and the absolute authority of (certain) men over wives, children, and
servants. Most famously, Filmer’s Patriarcha claims that, “If we compare the
natural duties of a father with those of a king, we find them to be all one,
without any difference at all but only in the latitude or extent of them.”2
Thus, a king has the same rights with respect to his subjects as a father does
over his children. Invoking both the Roman Pater Familias and the patri-
archal rule of Adam, Filmer saw the sovereign invested with absolute power
of life and death over wives, children, and subjects as the necessary condition
of social order.3 Filmer takes for granted that such natural hierarchy was
common sense among many if not most in the seventeenth century.
This discourse of absolute rule and arbitrary power was facing threats
from many sides, however, and was eventually overturned by a contrac-
tualism that insisted on individual liberty, natural equality, and authority
grounded in the consent of individuals. According to Mary Lyndon
Shanley, those who shared the patriarchalist interest in asserting “The
Naturall Power of Kinges Defended against the Unnatural Liberty of the
People”4 exploited the threat that contractualism might pose to male
authority in the household. Even if many among the reading public
might have been attracted to the Hobbesian notion that no man has
natural political authority over another, most could be counted upon to
recoil at the implication that no man has natural authority over a woman.
It was unthinkable to many that wives might be bound to their husbands
only by their own volition and thus authorized, for example, to dissolve
their marriage contracts. The metaphor of the polis as a family was thus
useful to rally the interests of men around preserving their authority in the
face of competing egalitarian movements and discourses.5
Hobbes’s argument for natural equality among all human beings,
regardless of sex, social station, divine election, or natural gift, posed one
2 Filmer, Patriarcha, 12. 3 Hulliung, “Patriarchialism.”
4 This is, of course, the subtitle to Filmer’s Patriarcha.
5 Shanley, “Marriage Contract,” 90. Eventually Locke emphatically rejected the symbolic association
of familial and civil authority, even as he remained acutely ambivalent about the implications for
natural hierarchy within the family (Locke, Second Treatise).
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of the most powerful challenges to the notion that the city is a family on the
model of pater patria. Rather than a society imagined as nested forms of
naturally guaranteed paternal authority, Hobbes presents social order as an
artifice built upon the wills of its individual members. Notwithstanding his
robust preference for monarchy and absolute rule, Hobbes undermines the
traditional basis for hierarchy grounded in natural differences.
Rather than rejecting any isomorphism of the family-polis, however,
Hobbes seems to invert it. Instead of imagining the city along the lines of a
large family ruled by a father, Hobbes treats the family as “a little city,” in
which each member has consented freely to the authority that structures
it.6 Notoriously, Hobbes insists that the relationship between an infant
and her caretaker is structurally homologous to the submission of subjects
in a commonwealth.7 Just as the parties to the social contract voluntarily
transfer their right to do as they will to the sovereign in exchange for the
protection of their bodies and property, an infant freely accepts the
authority of whoever preserves her life. The child, then, comes to be
obligated to respect the authority of the parent through the natural law
of gratitude to whoever might otherwise have chosen, for example, to
expose or suffocate her.8
Hobbes thereby provides a strong basis for natural equality, but arguably
at the price of a weak foundation for human affinity. He sets the stage for a
new philosophical anthropology that is no longer based in our natural
desire for community, or on the Aristotelian image of “man” as a “cou-
pling” or a “social animal.”While recognizing dependency as an inevitable
feature of finitude, and human relationships as necessary for procreation
and perseverance into adulthood, Hobbes treats society as the product of a
transformation of our given nature rather than as a natural consequence of
it. In his words:
That it is true indeed, that to Man, by nature . . . Solitude is an enemy; for
Infants have need of others to help them to live, and those of riper years to
help them to live well . . . The Vertue whereof to Children, and Fooles, and
the profit whereof to those who have not yet tasted the miseries which
accompany its defects, is altogether unknown; whence it happens, that
those, because they know not what Society is, cannot enter into it; these,
6 Hobbes, De Cive, 39, fn. 4. (Hereafter DC.)
7 Carole Pateman (“Women and Consent”) and Virginia Held (“Noncontractual Society”) have
expressed their horror at the idea that the nursling contracts away her rights to her caregiver but
Soran Reader (“Maternal Moral Authority”) embraces Hobbes’s robust notion of mother-right on
feminist grounds.
8 Hobbes, DC, 47–49.
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because ignorant of the benefit it brings, care not for it. Manifest therefore it
is, that all men, because they are born in Infancy, are born unapt for Society.
Many also (perhaps most men) either through defect of minde, or want of
education remain unfit during the whole course of their lives . . . wherefore
Man is made fit for Society not by Nature, but by Education.9
Even if solitude can lead only to death, one is not by nature drawn to our
fellows. Rather, many of us live out our lives unfit for human society and
unaware of the many benefits it provides. Only education can transform
our natural need for one another into sociability.
Thus, in the most visible seventeenth-century debates, the champions of
the polis as family metaphor were on the side of traditional patriarchalism.
Earlier discourses, however, show that the invocation of the polis as a family
may be mobilized on behalf of ideals other than absolute monarchy or
natural hierarchy. In the next section, I will briefly sketch how the analogy
between the family and the city operates in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
and Politics. I can then return to Spinoza.
6.2 The Oikos and the Polis in Aristotle
The main source for the analogy is, of course, Aristotle, for whom the three
main constitutional forms can be analogized to the relationships that
compose the household. In contrast to the patriarchalists, Aristotle relates
the oikos and the polis as true analogs, not as isomorphs. When analogies
relate sets of terms to one another, the terms need not have anything in
common. What is shared in the analogy is the relationship between the
terms. Thus, to observe that a wing is to a butterfly as a leg is to a dog is not
at all to say that a butterfly is a dog, or a wing a leg. Whereas Filmer claims
that the authority of a king is the authority of a father passed down
successively from the original paternity of Adam, Aristotle’s analogies
between the family and the household do not convey that a king is a father
to his people. Rather, his many complex and nested analogies between the
oikos and the polis indicate something about the relations that ought to
obtain in both domains.
Aristotle analogizes the relationship between father and son to that of a
king and his subjects. In general, for Aristotle, a good ruler makes decisions
guided by consideration of the advantage of the ruled rather than the ruler.
Thus, it is important that the ruler has virtue sufficient to prevent him
9 Hobbes, DC, 110. For further analysis of Hobbes on family, see chapters 5–6 of Feminist
Interpretations of Thomas Hobbes, edited by Nancy Hirschman.
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from using his authority on his own behalf rather than for the good of his
subjects. Paternal authority, the image of a virtuous father, is precisely that
kind of power that is exercised reliably on behalf of someone else, for the
good of the other rather than for oneself. Kingship is like paternal authority
in that, when it is just, it is exercised by a “self-sufficient” agent who does
not depend on his subjects for material or spiritual goods like money
and honor. The just king does not need to instrumentalize or extort his
subjects, and a just father will likewise not depend on his children for
recognition, work, or some other material benefit.10 Paternal or kingly
authority devolve into tyranny as soon as they deploy children or subjects
for their private advantage. Finally, a good father rules his son so that his
son can eventually rule himself. Paternity is thus a temporary rule because
it is an enabling mode of acting on another. A virtuous monarch will
likewise engender virtue in others in order that that they can become good
counsellors and ultimately replace him.
In an aristocracy, members of the ruling class, according to Aristotle,
stand in relation to their subjects as husbands do to their wives. As in the
previous case, the analogy conveys that the standards by which one
evaluates the relationship are similar in the cases of husbands and wives
and rulers in an aristocracy and their subjects. The husband, like the
aristocratic ruler, occupies his role on the basis of dessert, and he rules
over only what is appropriate to his peculiar virtues. If the relationship is
well-ordered, he recognizes those areas of the household over which his
wife is owed deference and does not try to assert his power over them. If he
assumes power beyond the scope that correlates with his virtue, the house-
hold relations degenerate.11 Again, it is important that husbands and
aristocratic rulers cultivate the virtue necessary to avoid ruling for personal
gain. The family or commonwealth thrives to the extent that each fills the
role for which his or her talents and wisdom are suited. If those in power
undermine the ability of each to exercise their distinctive forms of compe-
tence, the whole ceases to be well-ordered. This form of rule is not tempor-
ary, but co-contributing to the common good of the oikos requires a measure
of mutual trust and appreciation, as well as the recognition of “natural”
suitability defined by sex.
Finally, Aristotle analogizes “the rule of a multitude,” in which all
propertied males are equal, to a relationship between brothers. Even if
Aristotle appears not to endorse a constitution structured by a relationship
of equality and reciprocal limitation among peers without a common
10 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, 8.10.1160b (Hereafter NE.). 11 Aristotle NE, 8.10.1160b–1161a.
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authority,12 others embrace his image of democracy as a fraternal associa-
tion. This notion of democracy as an egalitarian fraternal community
persists today, most obviously in the motto of French republicanism. On
an Aristotelian model, an egalitarian household lacks a master but might,
in its most virtuous expression, observe the core principle of justice: to each
according to his virtue.13 For Aristotle, it remains important that different
members of the household exhibit different virtues. Brothers are equal in
that they are similar in status, age, and experience, but this does not mean
that they are interchangeable. As social animals with a cooperative char-
acter, brothers are involved in a kinship structure that differentiates the
activities and roles of its members.
Kinship structures that endure indicate a political way of life characterized
by a complex social network that is notmerely in the service of preserving the
species.14 Aristotle analogizes the city to the household to foreground how
social relations, whether or not they are hierarchical, involve a division of
labor, specialization in capacities, the placement of works into common
possession, and the formation of a common goal to which diverse pursuits
contribute.15Aristotle insists that the analogy between the household and the
city eventually breaks down by virtue of the relative unity of the household
in comparison to the city.16 Nevertheless, the household and city are both
partnerships in the perception of justice. As Aristotle famously observes,
what makes us “political animals” as opposed to merely gregarious animals
who live together and contribute to the well-being of the group is that we,
alone, have speech. Through speaking to one another, we reveal “the
advantageous and the harmful, and hence also the just and the unjust.”17
It is in this communication that we form a household and a city structured
by justice.
While some construe Aristotle’s famous description of man as the most
political animal to mean that the human essence is only actualized in
political participation, or legislation, the household analogy foregrounds
instead mutual dependency as a fact of life. The household, like the city, is
a system of active cooperation, ordered by a distribution of responsibilities
and a shared way of life. We might observe as well that even if the house-
hold is not the space in which human excellence is most manifest for
Aristotle, it is the site for acquiring those powers necessary for human
excellence. The household is the domain in which children are born,
12 For more on this topic, see Jill Frank, A Democracy of Distinction.
13 Lockwood, “Aristotle’s Household and City,” 6. 14 Depew, “Political Animals,” 171–72.
15 Aristotle NE, 8.10.1160b–1161a. 16 Aristotle, Politics, 2.2.1261a–1261b.
17 Aristotle, Politics, 1.2.1253a.
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raised, and disciplined. It is the locus of early education, the development
of speech, and the inculcation of a sense of justice. Even as the family is
embedded in a larger network of institutions, the household points to the
profound dependency of human animals, animals that must be nurtured
and educated to become either subjects capable of obeying the law or
citizens capable of deliberating about and decreeing laws.
6.3 Spinoza’s Quarrelsome Household
The Political Treatise manifests a somewhat awkward continuity with
the Aristotelian tradition of politics and ethics. Spinoza invokes the
Aristotelian notion of humanity as a social animal twice in the Political
Treatise and once in the Ethics. In all cases, he obliquely affirms the political
anthropology of “the Scholastics [who] want to call man a social animal”18
on the basis of the natural requirement of cooperation for the purpose of
self-defense.19 At the beginning of chapter 6, he again observes a universal
“desire” for “civil order.”20 Rather than seeing sociability as an outcome of
natural affection or lust, the necessity of care and love for the cultivation of
our distinctively human power, he characterizes civil life as attractive on
the basis of its opposite, the anxiety that is sure to accompany solitary
existence. We can scarcely hope to survive in solitude and we are hopelessly
vulnerable to hostile forces without others. Thus, he seems to be, at the
same time, Hobbesian and Aristotelian. Close attention to the passages
surrounding the oikos–polis analogy, however, reveal strong disagreement
with Hobbes’s conclusions about the benefits of absolute monarchy. At the
same time, it also suggests a criticism of the Aristotelian portrait of rule
through exemplary virtue. Navigating between the two options, Spinoza
presents a political theory distinctively his own, according to which human
virtue emerges from a discordant unity analogous to a quarrelsome family.
I will proceed in this section to draw a number of conclusions from a
close reading of TP, ch. 6, section 4.
[E]xperience seems to teach that it contributes to peace and harmony when
all power is conferred on one man. No state has stood as long without
notable change as that of the Turks. On the other hand, none have been less
lasting than popular, or democratic states. Nowhere else have there been so
many rebellions.
18 TP, ch. 2 | G III/281/28–30. The translations of Spinoza are from Edwin Curley,The CollectedWorks,
vols. 1–2, sometimes with minor modifications.
19 See also, E4p35s | G II/234/2–18. 20 TP, ch. 6 | G III/297/20–21.
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Still, if slavery, barbarism, and desolation are to be called peace, nothing
is more wretched for men than peace. No doubt there are more, and more
bitter, quarrels between parents and children than between masters and
slaves. Nevertheless, it doesn’t make for the orderly management of the
household to change paternal Right into master, and treat children like
slaves. To transfer all power to one man makes for slavery, not peace. As
we’ve said, peace does not consist in the privation of war but in a union or
harmony of minds.21
In considering, this complex passage we can first observe Spinoza’s rheto-
rical strategy. He stages an opposition between absolute monarchy and
popular government in order to convince his reader to be more concerned
with the vices proper to the former than the latter. The risks intrinsic to
despotism, he argues, are greater than those of rebellion. Thus, the first
conclusion we can draw is that, according to Spinoza:
6.3.1 Domination Is a Greater Threat to Stability than Is Conflict
Like Aristotle, Spinoza presents an undesirable form of rule as tyrannical,
likens it to a relationship between master and slave, and associates it with a
people he expects his audience to disdain. Just as Aristotle invokes the
Persians when disparaging a style of authority as tyrannical, Spinoza excites
early modern prejudices by linking the peace of enduring monarchies to
the oppressive rule of “Turks.” He expects his audience to be deeply
concerned about rebellions, but engages them rhetorically to assert that
(i) quarrel and disagreements are incapable of dissolving the social bond
entirely but (ii) despotism comes as close as possible to doing so. He begins
his chapter onmonarchy by observing a universal and irrepressible aversion
to solitude and desire for civil order in all human beings.22 He proceeds to
affirm that, while some kinds of association are dissolved by discord and
rebellion, commonwealths can never be fully dissolved. Thus, he suggests,
pace Hobbes, that humanity cannot be dispersed into a condition of
solitude, a war of all against all, but, if we live, we necessarily live together
in some form of cooperation. In Spinoza’s words, “as long as human
natural right is determined by each person’s power, and belongs to that
person alone, there’s not natural human right. It consists more in opinion
than in fact, since there’s no way to secure and maintain it.”23
Nevertheless, Spinoza artfully suggests that solitude can become the
human condition, not by virtue of an absence of coercive power, but
21 TP, ch. 6 | G III/298/14–26. 22 TP, ch. 6 | G III/297/13–22.
23 TP, ch. 2 | G III/281/16–19.
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through the presence of an excessively coercive power. In chapter 5,
Spinoza observes, “A commonwealth whose subjects, terrified by fear, do
not take up arms should be said to be without war, but not at peace.”When
a commonwealth’s stability is owed to “its subjects’ lack of spirit – so that
they’re led like sheep [pecora], and know only how to be slaves,” then it
ought to be called a “wasteland” rather than a “Commonwealth.”24 A civil
association that depends not on the powers, capabilities, and vitality of the
multitude but rather on the depletion and submission of a fearful populace
that hopes for nothing but to avoid death, Spinoza asserts, is not a human
society. Submission achieved by violent and terrifying means may suspend
the right (or power) of the subjects to take up arms, rebel, or quarrel, but it
renders them domesticated animals, a servile herd of sheep. The servile
herd suggested by the word “pecus” was contemptuously applied to human
beings in Roman literature that Spinoza knew well.25 Although pecora are
herd animals and thus ought to count as gregarious or social animals,
according to Aristotle’s taxonomy, Spinoza represents this coercive domes-
tication as a violent deprivation of sociability. Thus, even if the subjects of a
despot dwell side by side in a herd, they reside in a “wasteland,” a suggestive
rendering of the Latin solitudo. When compelled to obey only by the fear of
violent death, they are in a state of desertion and deprivation, persevering
only as a lonely collection of dominated subjects.
The association of despotism with solitude points us back to Spinoza’s
insistence that the basis of social order is an irrepressible and universal fear
of solitude: For each of us is implicitly aware that one lacks strength in
isolation, and, thus, each and every person by necessity strives for civil
society, for some stable form of cooperative association. Spinoza thereby
implicitly warns despotic monarchs that their subjects have an everlasting
appetite to unite in a common project of living and an inextinguishable
aversion to suffering an isolating fear of death. The Hobbesian state of
nature, however hypothetical it may be in the work of Hobbes, is better
understood not as an original condition but rather as a violent form of
institution. If we cannot but resist the anxiety of isolation, the fear of being
without allies, being devoid of partners in our desire to constitute a life,
our conatus will determine us to oppose rather than submit to absolute
monarchy. Moreover, as Spinoza asserts in the Ethics, each thing desires to
persevere in being in a “certain and determinate way.”26 Thus, Spinoza
insists that “human life [is] defined not merely by the circulation of blood,
24 TP, ch. 5 | G III/296/3–10. 25 In such authors as Horace, Catullus, and Juvenal.
26 E3p6d | G II/146/10–11.
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and other things common to all animals, but mostly by reason, the true
virtue and life of the Mind.”27 Spinoza thus argues that unyielding,
absolute monarchy is not the most stable regime but is, by virtue of the
universal and inalterable laws of human psychology, eternally precarious.
Absolute subjection contradicts “the necessity of human nature, however it
may be considered. That is . . . the universal striving all men have to
preserve themselves.”28 The desire to persevere in being immediately
appears as a desire for community with others and an aversion to isolation.
Moreover, we desire not community as such but a kind of intellectual
community, a form of association that allows us to exercise and experience
our physical as well as our mental power. Despotism depends on amplify-
ing to the maximal degree the fear of death, an isolating, antisocial, and
stupefying passion. We will not submit to an oppressive government that
only guarantees our physical safety; we will strive for the conditions that
strengthen our minds. Despotism – the suppression of contest, dissent, and
genuine sociability – thus triggers the desire for conspiracy as the only
apparent way to live in that “certain and determinate way” that is ours, and
which we cannot but pursue by whatever means necessary.
Spinoza suggests, however, that it is not only tyrants, despots, and
vicious rulers whose positions are threatened by internal scission. The
chapter on monarchy makes a broader claim that puts pressure also on
the picture of virtuous kingship favored by Aristotle. Thus, we can identify
a second conclusion closely related to the first:
6.3.2 Concentrated Authority Is Fragile Authority
It may not be terribly difficult for Spinoza to convince many of his readers
that the ostensible stability with which tyrants may be credited is owed not
to the virtues of their constitution but to the vices of brutal domination.
Yet Spinoza concomitantly argues that even the most virtuous king is
highly susceptible to abuse his power unless, as he concludes his chapters
on monarchy, “the King’s power is determined only by the power of the
multitude, and is preserved by the multitude’s support.”29 He thereby
makes a case that the excellence of a ruler is far from sufficient to safeguard
the subjects of a commonwealth from slavery.
Traditionally, a king’s authority is normatively associated with the kind
of rule practiced by a virtuous father. As Spinoza, too, notes in the
Theological-Political Treatise, a good father constrains and imposes rules
27 TP, ch. 5 | G III/296/12–15. 28 TP, ch. 5 | G III/291/22–26. 29 TP, ch. 7 | G III/323/10–12.
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on his son but does so only for his child’s benefit.30 Because a father has in
mind always the good of the son, he rules the son in a way that guides him
to the threshold of his own power. Paternal rule is thereby not structured
by fear of punishment and death but by constraints that enable the child
to cultivate strength of body and mind, and to eventually become his
own master. Spinoza begins his chapter on monarchy, the first chapter in
the Political Treatise with concrete institutional recommendations, by
stipulating that “it’s been necessary to set up a state, so that everyone –
both those who rule and those who are ruled – does what’s for the common
well-being, whether they want to or not.”31 He insists that a condition of
constraining rulers and subjects to live as reason prescribes is that “nothing
which concerns the common well-being is entrusted absolutely to the good
faith of any one person,”32 since it is “folly to require of someone else what
no one can ask of himself, that he look out more for others than for
himself.”33 Thus Spinoza denies, on the basis of the inalterable rules of
human psychology, that a virtuous king could be relied upon to rule on the
model of a good patriarch, for the king who can consistently put the
interests of his subjects before his own lives only in a “poet’s golden age”
or “a fairy tale.”34 Spinoza rejects a model of rule through virtue, embodied
in a benevolently paternalistic ruler and imitated by citizens and subjects.
The state must be designed to constrain the ruler at least as much as the
subjects, since it is especially those engaged in public business who will be
tempted to violate the laws due to greed and ambition.
Spinoza reinforces his objection to the image of a king as a good father
when he observes that “kings fear their sons . . .more than they love them,
and fear them the more, the more their sons are skilled in the arts of war
and peace, and the more their virtues make their subjects love them.
That’s why they try to educate them so they’ll have no cause to fear
them.”35 If kingship perverts the relationship between father and son,
how could kings be seen as benevolent patriarchs whose rule aims always
at the common good? Indeed, it is the fragility of the king’s power, the
isolation of the seat of authority, that urges him to protect himself
anxiously rather than promote the welfare of others, including his own
children. He regards his son more as a threat to his power than as a being
to love, one who might otherwise bring power-enhancing joys into his
life. The fatherhood practiced by a king is deformed by fear into an art of
debilitation.
30 TTP, ch. 16 | G III/195/5–8. 31 TP, ch. 6 |G III/297/34–298/2. 32 TP, ch. 6 | G III/298/4–5.
33 TP, ch. 6 | G III/298/9–10. 34 TP, ch. 1 | G III/275/22–25. 35 TP, ch. 6 | G III/299/13–15.
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Monarchical virtue and a concern for the common welfare is such a
difficult art, Spinoza maintains, because the burden of rule is simply too
great for a single individual, no matter how virtuous. Like the absolute
solitude of the state of nature, the solitude of monarchical rule is a fiction
rather than a reality. Drawing, indeed, on Aristotle’s Politics, Spinoza
declares that “a state thought to be an absolute Monarchy is really in
practice an Aristocracy. Of course, it’s not openly an aristocracy, only
covertly one. But that makes it the worst kind.”36 A concealed aristocracy is
the worst because the king’s counselors and the executors of his will could
be anyone, and those closest to him will exert an invisible influence on him
and impose untraceable threats. The more concentrated his rule is, the less
involved the constituents of the commonwealth are in his decision-making
and his protection. He may welcome this as a form of insulation from their
criticisms and squabbles. Yet, Spinoza argues, the more disconnected the
monarch is from his constituents, the more vulnerable is the seat of power.
It follows that someone entrusted with the whole right to rule will always fear
his own citizens more than his enemies. So he’ll try to look out for himself, to
plot against his subjects, not look after their interests – especially the ones
famous for their wisdom or more powerful because of their wealth.37
A monarch whose authority is not constrained by large consulting bodies,
Spinoza proceeds to argue, is one whose position will require him both to
plot against his subjects and to oppose those who manifest extraordinary
virtue, like wisdom: “From all these considerations it follows that a King is
less his own master, and the condition of his subjects is more wretched, the
more absolutely the right of the Commonwealth is transferred to him.”38
That is, the more disconnected, or absolute in a deficient sense, monarch-
ical rule is, the less powerful it is. The more independent, isolated, and
concentrated monarchical authority is, the less right it commands. Thus,
the monarch’s condition, like the human condition, can tend toward
solitude, and thus wretchedness. The solitude of the monarch is expressed
not only in his physical vulnerability but in his aversion to wisdom in his
fellows, including in his own child. His solitude is both a product and
producer of the suppression of wisdom. If the monarch could escape the
distortions of his condition imposed by fear of his own people, including
the sons in his own household,39 he would strive for a richer, more enabling
system of cooperation.
36 TP, ch. 6 | G III/298/33–35. 37 TP, ch. 6 | G III/299/9–12. 38 TP, ch. 6 | G III/299/19–21.
39 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ch. 13, “Let him therefore consider . . . what opinion he has . . . of his
children, and servants, when he locks his chests.”
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Instead of aristocracy disguised as monarchy, reason prescribes for a
historically monarchical commonwealth something closer to the institu-
tion of popular government with a monarchical face. Spinoza suggests as
much in his conclusion to the section on monarchy when he lays down the
“only Rule” he has followed in describing the foundations of monarchy:
Maximize the freedom of the multitude through conceiving the king’s
power as nothing but the power of the multitude.40 His institutional
recommendations draw a portrait of a king instituted by a free people as
a mechanism to convert their wisdom into laws and thereby tie each and
every one to the mast of collective intelligence. To see more clearly how
Spinoza builds to this conclusion, we should return to another important
feature of the oikos–polis analogy. Spinoza contrasts despotic government
that imposes a paralyzing form of peace to popular government fraught
with discord. He maintains, however, that, contrary to appearances, gen-
uine peace may very well be the fruit of such turbulent dispute between
unequals, between parents and children engaged in “frequent and bitter
quarrels.”Althoughmy final point is most difficult to show, in part because
it is in some tension with the account of social psychology in his Ethics,
I want to propose that the image of mental harmony emerging from
“frequent and bitter quarrels” suggests that:
6.3.3 Mental Harmony Demands Neither Homogeneity
of Spirit Nor the Extirpation of Passions
Chapter 1 of the Political Treatise concludes with the remark that “freedom
of mind, or strength of character, is a private virtue. But the virtue of the
state is security.”41 Yet the further one reads in the Political Treatise, the less
clear this distinction becomes. As I’ve already noted, in chapter 5, Spinoza
affirms that “the best state is one where men pass their lives harmoniously”
and insists that by life he means a distinctively human life, characterized by
“reason, the true virtue and life of the Mind.”42 He distinguishes a servile
life of fear, even when free of war, from a life in pursuit of virtue, which is
a life of peaceful and harmonious association (concordia). In chapter 6, he
draws the same contrast – tranquility imposed bymenace versus concordia –
so as to associate oppressive monarchy with an uncontested form of slavery
and popular government with peace, which, he repeats, “consist[s] not in
the privation of war, but in a union, or harmony of minds.”43 Thus
40 TP, ch. 7 | G III/323/9–13. 41 TP, ch. 1 | G III/275/33–34. 42 TP, ch. 5 | G III/296/14–15.
43 TP, ch. 6 | G III/298/24–26.
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strength of mind, or human virtue, clearly animates Spinoza’s political
proposals. We might ask, however, whether the strength of mind of a
commonwealth is precisely like the strength of mind of an individual.
Students of Spinoza’s Ethicsmight expect mental concord and harmony to
reflect an agreement, or even an identity among the parts, yielded by a
community of reason.44 Yet the Political Treatise links mental harmony, or
strength of mind, precisely to discord. Indeed, Spinoza’s rendering of the
oikos–polis analogy presents spirited discord as the genetic precondition of
mental fortitude and the unification of minds. We might ask, then, in the
spirit of Aristotle, what kind of unity belongs to the quarrelsome family
and, by analogy, to the democratic commonwealth?
Although Spinoza makes no systematic argument about the unity that
obtains in a virtuous commonwealth, let me propose some of its features.
(1) A virtuous commonwealth will be structured by the dictates of
reason: “a commonwealth will be the most powerful and the most
its own master, if it is founded on and directed by reason. For the
Right of a Commonwealth is determined by the power of a multitude
that is led as if by one mind. But there is no way this union of minds
can be conceived unless the Commonwealth aims at what sound
reason teaches us to be useful to all men.”45
(2) It will be so organized that the subjects will fear the solitude that
follows from the absence of the state rather than the state’s own
isolating policies; it will encourage respect for the laws; and it will
attach people to it through the shared benefits (corporeal and mental)
it provides.46
(3) It will involve the widest possible distribution of rights and respon-
sibilities among free men. Such a broad distribution minimizes
possibilities for corruption and optimizes the kind of advice available
to the sovereign power and maximizes the appearance of equality.
(4) It will encourage rather than suppress disputes, even bitter ones.
It is the fourth characteristic of political virtue that surprises, given
Spinoza’s assertions that reason follows from what we have in common
and expresses our agreement in nature, or power.47 Whereas passions
divide us from ourselves and each other, reason unites us.48 The unity, or
harmony of minds that Spinoza describes in the Political Treatise, however,
appears to be genetically dependent on discord. Indeed, in his political
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works, Spinoza repeatedly represents reason as the result of discord rather
than as the recognition of an underlying sameness.
In Political Treatise, chapter 9, for example, Spinoza insists that a large
assembly representing many points of view, interests in different trades,
and ties to different associations, clans, or traditions will help rather than
hinder the collective effort to legislate effectively.
For human wits are too sluggish to penetrate everything right away. But by
asking advice, listening, and arguing, they’re sharpened.When people try all
means, in the end they find ways to the things they want which everyone
approves, and no one had ever thought of before.49
Here, despite Spinoza’s peculiar claims about stacking the assembly with as
many people as possible to ensure a tiny fraction of individuals with mental
gifts, reason does not flow from the virtuous to the less virtuous. Reason
resides in no particular individuals prior to the conflictual engagement.
What unites the group is precisely what “no one had ever thought of
before,” a strength of mind that is, concomitantly, the product and the
producer of the group.
To re-invoke the analogy, mental harmony emerges from the kind of
unity that belongs to a quarrelsome family. Parents and children are
involved in an indissoluble association, like that of the commonwealth.
Husband and wife may get divorced (albeit not without profound con-
sequence in the seventeenth century), but parents and children are in some
form of relationship for life. However quarrelsome they are, they remain
determined by one another, as the children are flesh of the parents’ flesh
and mind of their mind.50 Long after the children leave home or their
parents die, the children will think with thoughts that emerged from their
relationship with their early caregivers. Parents place their children in a
form of subjection, they rule them, but (if they are virtuous) not so as to be
slaves. Rather, parents, like well-ordered sovereign powers, constrain their
children so that they may become free. Yet, Spinoza does not count on the
moral virtue of the parents to guide children by example. In fact, it is the
irrepressible desire of children to quarrel that ought to be credited with the
enabling form of unity that a household can provide. Paternal right is best
safeguarded from mutating into the right of ownership by the opposition
that the children continually pose to it. As long as parents resist the passion
49 TP, ch. 9 | G III/352/8–12.
50 Although I cannot do so here, I would argue that, on Spinoza’s model, the shared properties of body
(flesh of flesh) and mind would be no less true of adopted children and their caregivers.
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to smother conflict at the price of destroyed mental community, reason or
strength of mind can emerge for both rulers and ruled.
In order for mental harmony to be possible, the children in this analogy
may not yet be guided first and foremost by “the true principle of living,”
but at least some of them are developing those powers of mind and body
necessary to do so. While a just household ought to be ordered so as to
discourage destructive passions like hatred and envy, it should not suppress
childish eagerness to contest the rules of everyday life. Even toddlers do not
passively accept the authority of their elders. And the older children get, the
more effectively those who are not prevented from doing so will demand
that each and every rule be accounted for and adjusted so as to be
appropriate to particular situations as they arise. They may speak fre-
quently in the mode of resistance to constraint upon their desires, but
they are also striving to understand whether and how particular rules are
good or bad. Like democratic subjects, children strive to understand
whether and how rules enable or constrain their abilities to pursue their
particular ends. Rules for living are good, according to Spinoza, insofar as
they allow us to approach a model of human nature we have set before
ourselves.51 Part of the exercise of strengthening the mind is opposing or
demanding rationales for rules that seem to inhibit one’s desired form
of life.
While parents may have a strong desire to bring about what is good for
their children, it is not easy to determine what will benefit their charges. If
bodies are singular and goods, like medications, must vary for different
individuals, rulers cannot devise good rules without sensitivity to the
perceptions, needs, and distinctive capacities of their subjects. Thus,
neither rulers nor parents can avoid tyranny by the desire to benefit their
children. Their own decisions will be mere doctrine, imitation, or groping
in the dark, without the consistent questions, challenges, and tests with
which their children will confront them. And, as any parent knows, we will
be tempted regularly to impose a structure on the household that we
perceive to benefit us over them. We may often be unaware of our self-
serving impulses, which are easy to justify. But if we do not suppress
opposition to our authority, we will become more perspicacious about
whether and how our rules are working, and whom those rules serve.While
it is obvious that the household exists to preserve, nurture, and educate
children, it is also the case that the resistance of children to parental
authority educates the parents.
51 E4pref | G II/208/15–24.
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A partnership between women and men, Spinoza tells us in the Ethics,
can be free and thus rational when it is inspired not only by lust but also
by a desire to educate children.52 Yet, the striving to educate children can
only be actualized insofar as the parents allow themselves to be educated by
their children. As with the parents, it is not the case that children know
what is good for them and communicate it to their parents. Spinoza’s is
not a case for popular wisdom as such, but rather for the virtuous effects of
a community structured by affectionate conflict. Spinoza defines love as
the feeling of an increase in power attributed to an external cause.53
Households and cities are organizations by which we act on each other
so as to become more powerful. We fear isolation because it is a condition
of powerlessness, stupefaction, and vulnerability. So we respond to those
who enable us with love and attachment, a yearning to persevere in
community with them. Spinoza thinks that we need codes and rules by
which to organize our cooperative efforts, and the more the rules succeed in
activating our bodies and minds, the more solid will our attachments
become. Yet, when we sadden each other with our demands and rules,
and when we perceive unfairness, conflict will arise. Thus, Spinoza says we
are often “envious and burdensome to one another.”54Children frequently
and bitterly object to perceived unfairness and they will ceaselessly put
pressure on the rules to respond to the nuances of their needs and desires.
Indeed, both parents and children may quarrel when anyone imposes
something that seems external to their strivings. Yet, without the possibi-
lity of vital conflict, the wits of everyone will be dull. Without challenge
and mutual opposition, a household or city might be structured by non-
interfering solitudes, but it will not be able to engender the differentiated
unity characteristic of true harmony. As a result, the children will lack the
appropriate education to become rulers themselves, for they will perceive
rule as mere domination. Likewise, the parents will not be activated by the
pleasures and pains of conflicting demands and interpretations.
6.4 Conclusion
The human intellect is such that we cannot reason independently of others.
Reason, power, and authority are not delivered from the hilltops of the
virtuous to the valleys of the vulgar. Rather, in opposing and being
opposed, we develop the powers of our minds and bodies. In arousing
one another’s passions, not to the point of indignation but to the point of
52 E4app | G II/271/25–272/4. 53 E3p13s |G II/151/5–11. 54 E4p35s | G II/234/5–6.
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discovering the fallibility, maybe even the laughability, of our own pre-
scriptions and desires, we arrive at those ideas that can only be the property
of a collective. The virtuous parent, like the virtuous assemblyman, does
not impose his reason on his children. This is not because he is restrained
and in control of his passions, but because his reason does not preexist
the conflictual process of constituting a life in common. Harmony is not
pre-given by some biological or economic relationship constitutive of the
household. It is the effect of the powers emerging from the tense and
sometimes bitter project of living together. The strife of a life in common is
the necessary precondition for the amplification of everyone’s mental
powers, and thus the constitution of a common good. The lesson of
Spinoza’s oikos–polis analogy, I submit, is simply that without subjects
who oppose authority, however rancorously, neither reason nor peace
would be possible.
This lesson, however, was not sufficiently recognized by Spinoza him-
self. The logic of the Political Treatise entails that the greater and more
diverse the consulting body of lawmaking, the more rational is the com-
monwealth. The more the sovereign body allows for challenges and con-
tributions from its subjects, the better it will be able to discern the means to
sustaining and amplifying the common welfare. Yet, among subjects
Spinoza includes only those male children of free (property-owning) men
who will take their turn at popular rule. The very principles on which
mental virtue and harmony depend, however, suggest that there could be
no common welfare without the objections, and eventually the participa-
tion, of women and those in “servile” professions.55 As long as the subjects
and citizens of Spinoza’s commonwealth exclude the vast majority of the
population, the “one mind” that might be guided by reason is, indeed,
counterfactual.
55 For more on this topic, see Alexandre Matheron, “Femmes et serviteurs dans la démocratie
spinoziste,” and Hasana Sharp, “Eve’s Perfection.”
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